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Study of the GNSS Jamming in Real Environment
Toma´sˇ Morong, Pavel Puricˇer, Pavel Kova´rˇ
Abstract—GNSS systems are susceptible to radio interference
despite then operating in a spread spectrum. The commerce
jammers power up to 2 watts that can block the receiver function
at a distance of up to 15 kilometers in free space.
Two original methods for GNSS receiver testing were devel-
oped. The first method is based on the usage of a GNSS simulator
for generation of the satellite signals and a vector signal RF
generator for generating different types of interference signals.
The second software radio method is based on a software GNSS
simulator and a signal processing in Matlab. The receivers were
tested for narrowband CW interference, FM modulated signal
and chirp jamming signals and scenarios. The signal to noise
ratio usually drops down to 27 dBc-Hz while the jamming to
signal ratio is different for different types of interference. The
chirp signal is very effective.
The jammer signal is well propagated in free space while in
the real mobile urban and suburban environment it is usually
strongly attenuated.
Keywords—GNSS, GPS, jamming, test method, signal propa-
gation, interference immunity
I. INTRODUCTION
GNSS has become the primary navigation system andcurrently, more and more applications are dependent on
it. GNSS signal jamming by various jammers or by other
electronics systems cause a lot of problems and difficulty in the
transport systems [1]–[3] and it is one of the main factors that
limit the applicability of GNSS in safety-critical applications
like GNSS toll systems, civil and general aviation, intelligent
transports and smart cities etc. Many studies concerning GNSS
receiver behaviour under jamming have been presented in [4]–
[6]. GNSS jamming signals are classified in [7]. Chirp or FM
jammers that are featured with very high jamming effectivity
despite their simplicity and extremely low manufacture cost
are very popular.
GNSS jammers are widely used for overcoming the elec-
tronics systems of trucks [1] and other vehicles to make it
impossible to control the surveillance of the route and driving
safety rules etc. These jammers are installed in the track
cabs or on other places on the Earth surface. The jammed
receiver antennas are also located in truck or car roofs or under
windshields, or they are antennas of mobile receivers.
Most of the available jammers have a wider bandwidth the
civil signal L1 whose carrier frequency is 1575,42 MHz and
has null-to-null bandwidth of a spread spectrum is approxi-
mately 2 MHz.
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The power level of the jamming signal must be relatively
high [7] to stop the operation of the mobile GNSS receiver
as the signal is attenuated by the propagation near the Earth
surface and blockage by various obstacles. The effect on the
receivers in the air (aircraft or drone) is much bigger because
of the free space propagation. As the jammers use brute
force method by a simple chirp signal to jam the receiver,
the distortion of the jammer signal by its propagation like
time-delay spreading or frequency spreading is not important.
Only signal level or jamming to useful signal ration (J/S) is
important [8].
Our intention is to develop a methodology for predicting the
jammer effect for various situations and scenarios. The user
can use this data for development of the countermeasure that
can be based on protection of some critical areas, technical
improvement of the GNSS receivers or other technical or
organization provisions.
The investigation of the GNSS jamming can be divided
into two problems, the investigation of the jamming signal
propagation and assessment of GNSS jamming immunity.
We investigated jammer signal propagation, especially sig-
nal level for various typical scenarios like an urban, suburban,
rural area or in the air.
The theoretical determination of the accepted interference
level for GNSS receivers is very complicated because of an
absence of the details of the implementation of the signal pro-
cessing inside the receiver. The usable method is to measure
it and for this reason, the two methods for testing receivers
were developed.
The paper is organized as follow, firstly we classify the
GNSS interference signals and signal propagation models suit-
able for mobile receivers or receivers in the air are presented.
Secondly, the test methods of the GNSS receiver interference
immunity are described.
Thirdly the description of the experimental setup for veri-
fication of the signal propagation is introduced, then follows
the presentation of the experimental data and conclusions.
II. GNSS INTERFERENCE
GNSS interference can be classified according to many
aspects, for instance, according to the source into artificial
or natural. The main natural source of GNSS interference
is the Sun. During strong Sun radio bursts, the function of
many radio end electronic systems could be degraded or even
disabled [8]. Fortunately, the occurrence of strong Sun radio
bursts is very seldom.
The artificial interference can be further classified onto the
intentional or unintentional. The unintentional interference is
produced by human industrial, transport, telecommunication
or other systems. Those systems transmit their signals on
frequencies close to bands of GNSS.
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The intentional interference can be further classified onto
jamming, and spoofing [9]. The jamming is usually a simple
interference signal of an appropriate level that makes it diffi-
cult or impossible to process GNSS signal. There are a few
types of possible jamming signals. For example, narrowband
noise, broadband noise, tones and pulse etc. [7]
Spoofing is a false signal or signals for confusing the GNSS
receiver. The intention is to force GNSS receivers to interpret
the spoofing signal as an authentic one.
The generation of spoofing is currently very complicated
from a technical point of view, but in the future, the required
technology will be much cheaper and more accessible thanks
to the software radio.
GNSS systems use Direct Sequence Spread spectrum tech-
nique that is featured with the interference immunity. Non-
correlated interference is attenuated of processing gain
Gp =
Bs
Bb
(1)
where Bs is bandwidth if the spread signal by the so-called
ranging code and Bb of the primary modulated signal by
navigation message. The maximum processing gain of GPS
L1 C/A signal is approximately 43 dB. The real processing
gain depends on the signal processing in the receiver, mainly
on coherent integration time [10] and reaches up to 30 dB at
a standard GPS receiver.
The question is what is the minimal power of GNSS jammer
to be able to emit critical level in given environment. The
problem is reduced to study the link budget or path loss PL
of the radio channel from Jammer to the GNSS receiver [12].
III. PROPAGATION MODELS
The path loss is expressed
PL[dB] = 10log
Pt
Pr
(2)
where Pt and Pr are transmitted and received power. In free
space for a distance between transmitter and receiver antenna
d, the received power in antenna far-field is expressed
Pr(d) =
PtGtGrλ
2
(4pi)2d2L
(3)
where Gt and Gr are the gain of the transmitter and receiver
antennas, λ is wavelength and L represents system loss, that
does not relate with signal propagation. In practical situations,
the path loss expresses as the path loss in reference distanced
d0, free space loss form distance d0 to d [12].
PLd = PL(d0) + 10γlog(d/d0) +Xσ (4)
The factor γ represents propagation factor that depends on
environment and Xσ is a random zero-mean Gaussian variable
of standard deviation σ that reflects the variation of path loss.
The propagation factor for free space is 2, 2.8 ÷ 3 for typical
outdoor environment, 4 for wet soil and 4 ÷ 6 for indoor
environment [13].
The propagation of the radio signal in real environment is
effected by reflection, diffraction, scattering and attenuation
on various obstacles like buildings, vegetation, Earth surface
etc. The propagation is then very complicated.
The most common empirical or statistical model of path
loss for outdoor are
• Okumura-Hata Model
• COST Hata model
A. Okumura-Hata model
The median path loss is given
L50%[dB] = LFSL+AMU −HMG−HBG−
∑
KCorr (5)
where LFSL is a free space attenuation, AMU is a median of
additional attenuation, HMG and HBG are mobile and ground
stations antenna high factors, and finally KCorr are correction
factors gains. All variables are in dB. The correction factors of
the model were obtained by the measurements [15]. The range
of model validity is: frequency 150 ÷ 1500 MHz, effective
ground station antenna high 30 ÷ 200 m, effective mobile
station antenna high 1 ÷10 m and distance 1 ÷ 20 km.
The model was then upgraded and extended for frequencies
1150 ÷ 2000 MHz and modified by Okumura.
B. Other models
The COST 231WalfishIkegami Model is an path model for
modelling Line of Sights and Non Line of Sights propagation
in short distance [16].
For indoor propagation the ITU-R model was developed.
The path loss in indoor area is expressed
PL(d) = 37 + 30log(d) + 18.3Nfloor
(
Nfloor+2
Nfloor+1
−0.48
)
(6)
where Nfloor is a a number of floors between transmitter and
receiver and d is a bistance.
For outdoor the path loss is
PL(d) = 40log(d) + 30log(fc) + 49 (7)
IV. ASSESSMENT OF GNSS JAMMING IMMUNITY
Based on [11] we developed two test methods which are
suitable for the quality assurance of GNSS receivers. The
basic essence of the designed methods is to create a testing
signal which can be used as a reliable test of GNSS receivers.
Furthermore it is an important creation of a unique method
needed to evaluate a behavior of the receiver. This process
is based on the processing of NMEA data provided by the
receiver.
The goal of the test methods is to find out the threshold
value of J/S for which the GNSS receiver is not able to
determine its position. This value is determined from the
NMEA output of the receiver and we called it a critical value.
We analyze an indicated signal to noise ratio C/No. The C/No
is accurately described as the carrier wave power to noise
power density ratio. The C/No gives a good measure of the
Spectral power density of a received signal.
The reason why two different test methods were used is
the possibility to compare measured results. The methods are
described in the next paragraphs along with obtained results.
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A. Classical method
This method is based on a combination of the signal of a
GPS jammer with a GPS generator. The signal from the GPS
jammer is attenuated to the required level by a step attenuator.
The combined signal is imputed by coaxial cable to the input
connector of the receiver. A block diagram of this method is
shown in Figure 1.
GPS
generator GPS receiver U-centerSignal combiner
GPS jammer Variable signalattenuation
Fig. 1. Block diagram of a testing procedure in the classical method
We are able to gain the value J/S through this method and
an effective range of individual jammers as well.
B. Software radio method
The software radio method is based on the generation of
the test signal by software and replay of this signal by a
software radio. The adding of the interference signal is done
due to Matlab. This method is more effective than the classical
method. The main advantages are:
• The low cost of a software GNSS simulator
• The repeatability of measurement
• Usage any interference signal
The setup of the software method is shown in Fifure 2.
Software signal
simulation
Signal
Archiving
Signal
processing in
Matlab
GPS receiver
Software-
defined radio
Signal
Archiving 
Fig. 2. The setup of the software method
At first, we generated a GPS signal via a software GNSS
simulator. The software enables to set up the simulation
parameters and trajectory of satellites. The output is in a
binary file form and we used one-hour signal duration. The
adding of the interference signal was done in Matlab. In our
case, the GPS signal was jammed by several different types of
signals. For simplification of the receiver testing, we divided
the signal into time segments in which the J/S was constant.
The jamming intensity was gradually increased. The resulting
signal is stored on disk. We used a software-defined radio for
replaying the test signal. The output of the SDR was directly
connected to the input connector of the GPS receiver.
V. INVESTIGATION OF JAMMING SIGNAL PROPAGATION
As we evolve the methodology for predicting jammer effect
in various situations the study of the propagation of the jammer
signal is a building block for us. To begin with, we have made
a simple measurement based on transmitting and a receiving
signal that is close to the jamming signal.
For experimental measurement an amateur radio frequency
0.23 meters has been used. This band is allocated in the
middle of the lower and upper GNSS bends. Power Level is
low to avoid jamming of primary radio services around. The
attenuation of the signal is very similar to the attenuation of
GNSS signals.
The test signal is generated by a tiny RF generator based
on the ADF 4361 chip to be able to use a drone for carrying
it.
Before each measurement, the system was calibrated to
obtain path loss in reference distance 10 meters.
Basically, the power level of a peak of the receiving signal
has been measured. The test receiver antenna has been placed
to the height 1.5 meters above ground in a specific position.
The position of the RF generator was changed in distance and
height.
Our measurements were performed during clear sky to not
have to assume atmospheric attenuation.
Fig. 3. Illustration of measurement
VI. RESULTS OF INTERFERENCE IMMUNITY OF THE GNSS
RECEIVER
This section presents tests results of two U-blox GNSS
receivers, EVK-6H and EVK-M8T. Tested receivers are used
in a wide range of mass market and industrial systems in-
cluding drones. The receiver manufacturer provides a U-center
software that enables analysis of the receiver measurement
and saves data for further processing. The software simpli-
fies the measurement processing and receiver performance
determination. The following paragraph present test results
for the typical jamming signal as a chirp signal. The receiver
operation is investigated as an indicated signal to noise ration
C/No as a function of the J/S value.
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A. Critical value of J/S
The chirp jamming wave in a classical signal was generated
by a real jammer TG-5CA that is ilustrated in Figure 4. The
jamming signal power level is 32 dBm and the bandwidth of
the signal is 18.5 MHz.
Fig. 4. Jammer TG-5CA
In software method, the chirp signal of bandwidth 6 MHz
was generated as the used SDR is featured with bandwidth is
only 8 MHz. The results are shown in graphs and Table I. The
results of the classical method are shown in Figure 5 whereas
the software method in Figure 6.
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Fig. 5. Classical method Jamming: chirp signal from the jammer TG-5CA
TABLE I
RESULTS OF TEST METHODS
Classical method Software radio method
C/No Critical C/No Critical
Receiver [dB-Hz] J/S [dB] [dB-Hz] J/S [dB]
EVK-6H 28 38 32 37
EVK-M8T 32 39 30 39
The result of those methods is a knowledge that the receiver
is able to process narrow-band interference of J/S 50 dB, the
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Fig. 6. Software method Jamming: chirp signal
signal to noise ratio drops down to 27 dBc-Hz. The immunity
to the wide interference is approximately 10 dB lower.
B. Effective range of Jammer
The key parameter of the jammer or GNSS receiver used is
an effective range. The effective range is a range in which the
jammer can evoke the signal of critical power level or higher.
For determination of the critical range, we consider ideal
(free space) jammer signal propagation without the impact
of the Earth surface and other obstacles that can block or
attenuate jammer signal. The effective range was calculated
based on the formula 3 as the jammer operation is illegal. The
standard power level -158.5 dBW of GPS signal on an ideal
hemispheric antenna of gain 3 dB was considered [21]. The
jammer effective range for interference signal power 32 dBm
is in Table II.
TABLE II
RESULTS - EFFECTIVE RANGE OF JAMMER
Receiver Max Effective Range [km]
EVK-6H 16
EVK-M8T 14
VII. RESULTS OF JAMMING SIGNAL PROPAGATION
Our measurement took place in four different environments
as urban, suburban, rural and vegetation. All results are shown
in tables below. The value of the power level of the peak of
the receiving signal is label as Pr in dB.
The position of the RF generator was being changed man-
ually in all environments except in rural. In that case, the
position was being changed by a drone to reach higher altitude.
Based on formula 3 for free space the value of power level
decreases by 6 dB if the distance between the transmitter and
receiver enlarges two times. This corresponds to the theoretical
value of γ = 2.
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In the real environment, the value of the power lever
decreases more. This corresponds with the higher value of
the propagation factor γ.
In our case the propagation factor γ has been estimated as
a slope of linear regression of path losses that were measured.
A. Propagation in forest
Two parts of results are presented within this measurement.
Both of them come from a forest but one is from a footpath and
the second one is from impermeable vegetation. The results
are shown in tables III and IV.
TABLE III
FOOTPATH
Height of Tx [m] 0 1.5 4
Distance [m] Pr [dB]
10 -18 -4.2 -1.5
20 -23 -12 -6.3
30 -30 -22 -14.5
γ 2.4 3.6 2.6
TABLE IV
FOREST
Height of Tx [m] 0 1.5 4
Distance [m] Pr [dB]
10 -8.2 -3.8 -12
20 -20 -18 -11
30 -30.5 -18.5 -25.5
γ 4.6 3.3 2.5
B. Propagation above grass in rural environment
TABLE V
RURAL ENVIRONMENT
Height of Tx [m] 1.5 5 10 15 20
Distance [m] Pr [dB]
20 -11 -15 -21 -17 -33
30 -15.5 -19 -17 -19 -23
50 -21 -24 -34.5 x x
γ 2.5 2.3 3.6 x x
C. Propagation in urban environment
The RF generator was placed in different places in the
urban environment. Some potential positions of the source of
jamming were simulated. Some positions of the RF generator
were behind buildings some were not. Results from this part
of the measurement are shown in Table VI.
Figures 8 and 7 show the selected positions of the RF
generator in the urban environment.
TABLE VI
PROPAGATION ABOVE ASPHALT IN SUBURBAN ENVIRONMENT
Height of Tx [m] 0 1.5
Distance [m] Pr [dB]
18 -18 -21
21 -35 -19
34 -35 -22
38 -36 -36
44 -36 -33
45 -43 -37
58 -35 -35
72 -43 -33
76 -37 -18
78 -42 -42
79 -34 -34
92 -37 -37
106 -41 -41
107 -44 -43
133 -35 -35
Fig. 7. Distance between RF generator and receiver 58 m
Fig. 8. Distance between RF generator and receiver 106 m
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D. Propagation above concrete in suburban environment
TABLE VII
SUBURBAN ENVIRONMENT
Height of Tx [m] 0 1.5
Distance [m] Pr [dB]
10 -6.7 -0.5
20 -23.5 -5.5
30 -31.3 -8.4
40 -29.5 -12.2
50 -32.5 -15.5
60 -36.8 -18.2
γ 3.6 2.2
VIII. DISCUSSION
Based on the results of both test methods the threshold value
J/S is almost the same. The bandwidth of the jamming signal
must be wider than 2 MHz to effectively jam GPS L1 signal.
The wideband jamming signals seem to be more effective
than the narrowband ones because the narrowband interference
can be effectively suppressed by the adaptive notch filter while
the wideband ones cannot. This is why the bandwidth of the
efficient jamming signal should be wider than 2 MHz for GPS
L1 frequency.
Carrier-to-Noise-Density Ratio measured by both receivers
are different. The receiver EVK-M8T has always the higher
value of C/No. It might be caused by different algorithmics of
signal processing.
The important result in case of the jamming signal propa-
gation is the propagation factor γ. This value has been higher
than the theoretical value γ = 2 in all environments. The worst
propagation of the signal is in vegetation where γ = 4.6.
IX. CONCLUSION
We present two methods for testing the interference immu-
nity of the civil GNSS receivers. The advantage of the classical
method is the possibility to use a real jammer. The second
software method is based on an application of software radio.
The method is featured by a high flexibility and repeatability.
Both methods were used for practical testing of two GPS
receivers. The obtained results are in good conformity.
The minimal values of C/No have been from 28 dB-Hz to
32 dB-Hz for chirp jammer.
The experiments proved the theoretical assumptions that the
GNSS jammer signal is propagated very well in free space
while the propagation in real indoor and outdoor environment
is much worse and that is the problem. As the jammer users
usually jam the mobile receivers they are inclined to use high
power jammers that are featured with long range in free space.
The GNSS jammers are then very dangerous for aircraft or
UAV, especially in low heights.
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